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WHAT IS PUBLIC INTEREST LAW? EMPIRICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON AN OLD QUESTION
Ann Southworth∗
INTRODUCTION
In the mid-1970s, Professor Marc Galanter predicted that public interest law might
improve the lot of “have-nots” by facilitating their organization into “coherent groups that have
the ability to act in coordinated fashion, play long-run strategies, [and] benefit from high-grade
legal services.”1 He noted that this new practice form might potentially “creat[e] a capacity for
the previously unorganized to participate in the legal process in the manner of an organization”
and enlist the kinds of sophisticated, intensive, long-term legal assistance that the “haves”
routinely enjoy.2 He cautioned, however, that “the ‘public interest’ format” could be
“conscripted” by almost any imaginable interest3 and that it “can be used to augment the
representation of ‘haves’ as well of unorganized ‘have-nots.’”4 Along with other observers of
the time, Galanter recognized that the form and rhetoric of public interest law could be deployed
on behalf of groups that were not among the intended beneficiaries of the form’s founders and
thus advance public policy goals that those founders would have opposed.
Although the first wave of public interest lawyers and their patrons may have agreed as to
how public interest law should be defined, what constituencies it should serve, and what policies
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it should advance,5 those questions are now deeply contested.6 A tremendous variety of groups
now claim to speak for underrepresented constituencies, and many of those groups oppose one
another. The field has also expanded in terms of the types of strategies employed and the
activity’s geographic scope.
Previous scholarship has analyzed various aspects of this expansion of the concept of
public interest law, including the creation of scores of conservative and libertarian legal
advocacy organizations in the image of public interest organizations of the political left,7
ambitious litigation and legislative campaigns pursued by these groups,8 and their networks.9
Scholars have documented the “internationalization” of public interest law,10 changes in structure
and funding,11 and the proliferation of private firms that claim the public interest mantle.12
My current research builds on this scholarship and relates directly to Galanter’s
observation about the malleability of the concept of public interest law and its availability to
5

See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
Ann Southworth, Conservative Lawyers and the Contest Over the Meaning of “Public Interest Law”, 52 UCLA L.
REV. 1223, 1224 (2005).
7
See LEE EPSTEIN, CONSERVATIVES IN COURT 145 (1985); ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT:
PROFESSIONALIZING THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION 8–10 (2008); STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE
CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 267 (2008); Oliver A. Houck, With
Charity for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1443 (1984); Southworth, supra note 6, at 1224.
8
See HANS J. HACKER, THE CULTURE OF CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIAN LITIGATION (2005); see also SOUTHWORTH,
supra note 7, at 149–67; Jayanth K. Krishnan & Kevin R. den Dulk, So Help Me God: A Comparative Study of
Religious Interest Group Litigation, 30 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 233, 242 (2002).
9
See John P. Heinz, Ann Southworth & Anthony Paik, Lawyers for Conservative Causes: Clients, Ideology, and
Social Distance, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 5, 33–35 (2003); see also Anthony Paik, Ann Southworth & John P. Heinz,
Lawyers of the Right: Networks and Organization, 32 LAW & SOC. INQ. 883 (2007).
10
See Scott L. Cummings, The Internationalization of Public Interest Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 891, 1034–35 (2008); see
also Scott L. Cummings & Louise G. Trubek, Globalizing Public Interest Law, 13 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN
AFF. 1 (2008).
11
See Laura Beth Nielsen & Catherine R. Albiston, The Organization of Public Interest Practice: 1975–2004, 84
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REV. 2027 (2008).
12
See Scott L. Cummings & Ann Southworth, Between Profit and Principle: The Private Public Interest Firm, in
PRIVATE LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF PRO BONO IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(Robert Granfield & Lynn Mather eds., 2009); see also Scott L. Cummings, Privatizing Public Interest Law, 25
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2011).
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“haves” as well as “have-nots.” It invokes the concept of “framing”—the processes by which
social actors seek to influence various audiences’ interpretations of reality13—to explore how a
once reasonably contained concept has yielded to a variety of overlapping and sometimes
inconsistent meanings. This research treats “public interest law” as a keyword—a phrase that
assumes different meanings as it is “mobilized by different groups of social actors for different
purposes.”14 It analyzes a variety of public data sources—U.S. Supreme Court briefs, legislative
testimony, stories in major newspapers, organizations’ websites, scholarship eligibility, student
loan qualification standards, and placement materials generated by law schools and career
advising services—to investigate how various actors have used the term “public interest law”
and influenced our understandings about what public interest law is. It will explore how the
evolution of the term in public discourse relates to the history of public interest legal practice.
The research is far from complete. This Article nevertheless describes some preliminary
findings from two public data sources in which conflict over the meaning of the phrase “public
interest law” has been particularly visible. First, it summarizes data regarding the advocacy
groups’ self-characterization in U.S. Supreme Court briefs, in which organizations hold
unilateral control over the description of their structure and missions. Second, it considers
accounts of “public interest law” groups in two major newspapers, a forum in which journalists
are “both disseminators of and audiences for” competing definitions.15 Together, these sources
show that a phrase once applied to a relatively small number of organizations and practices that
served a limited set of constituencies is now claimed by, and used to describe, a much larger set

13

Peer C. Fiss & Paul M. Hirsch, The Discourse of Globalization: Framing and Sensemaking of an Emerging
Concept, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 29 (2005); see also David A. Snow et al., Frame Alignment Processes,
Micromobilization, and Movement Participation, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 464 (1986).
14
Amin Ghaziani & Marc J. Ventresca, Keywords and Cultural Change: Frame Analysis of Business Model Public
Talk, 1975–2000, 20 SOC. FORUM 523 (2005).
15
Fiss & Hirsch, supra note 13, at 47.
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of organizations, actors, policy agendas, and political perspectives. These data also suggest that
during a period when conservative and libertarian groups have become increasingly assertive in
claiming the public interest designation, the media have used the term more cautiously.
Frame contests sometimes have significant public policy consequences.16 The contest
over the meaning of public interest law is symbolically important because the phrase conveys
approval; the organizations, activities, and lawyers associated with the term are understood to
enhance access to justice, or advance some vision of the public good. This struggle over
discourse also carries direct and practical implications because financial benefits—such as law
school scholarship eligibility, summer funding, loan forgiveness, and pro bono credit—
sometimes turn on the definition of public interest law. Thus, how the phrase is used and defined
is integrally related to the allocation of some types of legitimacy and resources within the
American legal profession. Moreover, this contest over framing may have significant
consequences for judicial decision making and public policy formation to the extent that public
interest law organizations and lawyers exercise special influence tied to their perceived status as
champions of underrepresented constituencies.
II. A SKETCH OF THE FIELD: DEFINITIONAL AMBIGUITY AND CONTESTED DISCOURSE
The founders of the first wave of groups to call themselves “public interest law”
organizations in the late 1960s sought to use legal tools to protect the interests of constituencies
that they claimed were inadequately represented in the political process and, therefore,
vulnerable to the decisions of unresponsive corporate and government bureaucracies. Borrowing
from earlier models, including the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People Legal Defense and Educational Fund
16

See Julie L. Andsager, How Interest Groups Attempt to Shape Public Opinion with Competing News Frames, 77
JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 577 (2000); see also William A. Gamson & Andre Modigliani, Media Discourse
and Public Opinions on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1 (1989).
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(LDF), and legal aid societies,17 the new “public interest lawyers” claimed to represent large,
diffuse classes of people who faced collective action problems and those who otherwise could
not afford to hire lawyers.18
For a brief period, the term “public interest law” may have been widely understood to
apply to a well-specified set of institutions, practices, and policy agendas. When a team of social
scientists funded by the Ford Foundation studied and assessed “public interest law” in the mid1970s, they reported finding “consensus” about its general definition: “[A]ctivity that (1) is
undertaken by an organization in the voluntary sector; (2) provides fuller representation of
underrepresented interests (would produce external benefits if successful); and (3) involves the
use of law instruments, primarily litigation.”19 The authors identified eleven subject areas that
“encompass[ed] the overwhelming majority of public interest law activities”20: civil liberties,
environmental protection, consumer protection, employment, education, media reform,
healthcare, welfare benefits, housing, voting, and occupational health and safety.21 Although

17

See Robert Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207, 209–
18 (1976).
18
See Robert Borosage et al., Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069 (1970); see also
Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr., In Pursuit of the Public Interest, 84 YALE L.J. 182 (1974) (book review).
19
Burton A. Weisbrod, Conceptual Perspective on the Public Interest: An Economic Analysis, in PUBLIC INTEREST
LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 22 (Burton A. Weisbrod et al. eds., 1978) [hereinafter PUBLIC
INTEREST LAW]. This definition is consistent with other definitions offered around the same time. See, e.g.,
COUNCIL FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FINANCING PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN
AMERICA 6 (1976) (“Public interest law is the name that has recently been given to efforts to provide legal
representation to previously unrepresented groups and interests.”); Gordon Harrison & Sanford M. Jaffee, Public
Interest Law Firms: New Voices for New Constituencies, 58 A.B.A. J. 459, 459 (1972) (“Public interest law is the
representation of the underrepresented in American society.”); cf. Charles R. Halpern & John M. Cunningham,
Reflections on the New Public Interest Law: Theory and Practice at the Center for Law and Social Policy, 59 GEO.
L.J. 1095 (1971) (arguing that public interest lawyers were necessary to represent groups whose interests were
underrepresented in administrative agencies and courts).
20
Burton A. Weisbrod, What Might Public Interest Law Accomplish: Distributional Effects, in PUBLIC INTEREST
LAW, supra note 19, at 102, 149.
21
See Weisbrod, supra note 19, at 57 tbl.4.7.
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they detected “less agreement as to the meaning of being ‘underrepresented,’”22 they
nevertheless found eleven primary categories of intended beneficiaries of public interest law: the
“general population”; the “[p]oor, in general”; women; prisoners; children; blacks; “Spanishspeaking people”; the mentally impaired; the elderly; Native Americans; and other racial or
ethnic minorities.23
Ambiguous elements at the heart of the concept of public interest law—especially the
notion of underrepresentation—contained the seeds of the term’s potentially vast application.
The practice form’s vague contours and lofty label made it an inviting vehicle for all sorts of
groups that appreciated the potential advantages of enlisting lawyers in the nonprofit sector in
their efforts to achieve public policy goals. Since the mid-1970s, lawyers and their patrons have
founded hundreds of “public interest law” organizations. Many of those groups have advocated
for the liberal policy agendas associated with the first wave of public interest law—civil liberties,
civil rights, environmental and consumer protection, the expansion of welfare benefits and
housing for the poor, media reform, and occupational health and safety. But conservatives have
also entered the fray, establishing a set of institutions that claim to speak for different
constituencies whose interests have collided with the policy agendas of the first wave of public
interest law groups, such as taxpayers, small business owners, crime victims, poor whites, and
religious people, among others.24 These organizations have pursued causes associated with the

22

Id. at 29.
See id. at 58 tbl.4.8; accord Federal Criminal Code, Amnesty, Gun Control, Bank Secrecy Are Debated by the
House of Delegates, 61 A.B.A. J. 1079, 1084 (1975) (reporting on ABA House of Delegates resolution, which stated
that it is the professional responsibility of each lawyer to provide “public interest legal services” and defining the
phrase as: “a legal service provided without fee or at a substantially reduced fee, which falls into one or more of the
following areas: poverty law, civil rights law, public rights law, charitable organization representation,
administration of justice”); COUNCIL FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW, supra note 19, at 6–7 (“[T]he ordinary marketplace
for legal services fails to provide such services to significant segments of the population and to significant interests.
Such groups and interests include the poor, environmentalists, consumers, racial and ethnic minorities, and others.”).
24
See SOUTHWORTH, supra note 7, at 9–33.
23
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political right—for example, advocating against school busing, abortion, affirmative action,
unions, gun control, and gay rights, and in favor of tougher criminal laws and enforcement, tort
reform, school vouchers, and a greater role for religion in the public sphere.25 The first
conservative public interest law groups were crude imitations of their most successful liberal
counterparts; as described in a scathing report by conservative critic Michael Horowitz for the
Scaife Foundation in the late 1970s, many of these organizations were widely perceived as
“hyphenated ‘public interest’ pretenders.”26 Since then, however, conservative public interest
organizations have become more specialized, sophisticated, and effective.27
In addition to the tremendous expansion of the types of political missions espoused by
groups that call themselves public interest law organizations, the field has also grown in terms of
the strategies employed by such organizations and the geographic reach of their agendas. The
first public interest law organizations focused primarily on advocacy in courts and administrative
agencies, but today many of them employ broader tactical repertoires that include legislative
strategies, grassroots organizing, and sophisticated media campaigns.28 Lawyers have also
experimented with new forms of transnational advocacy and efforts to bring international human
rights concepts to bear domestically.29 And while lawyers in private firms have long engaged in

25

See id.
Michael Horowitz, The Public Interest Law Movement: An Analysis with Special Reference to the Role and
Practices of Conservative Public Interest Law Firms 1 (1980) (unpublished memorandum) (on file with author).
27
Southworth, supra note 6, at 1255–62.
28
For case studies documenting the broad range of strategies employed by lawyers serving movements and their
sophistication regarding the limitations of litigation, see Michael McCann & Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law’s
“Allurements”: A Relational Analysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the United States, in CAUSE LAWYERING:
POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 261 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998).
See also Ann Southworth, Lawyers and the “Myth of Rights” in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice, 8 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 469 (1999); Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1235
(2010).
29
See Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Constructing Law Out of Power: Investing in Human Rights as an
Alternative Political Strategy, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA 354, 360 (Austin Sarat &
Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001); see also Cummings & Trubek, supra note 10, at 25–26.
26
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pro bono and law reform work,30 private sector lawyers may now play a larger role in the overall
public interest law industry than they did in the 1970s.31
Thus, a concept that was once understood to apply primarily to liberal causes, pursued
through litigation and administrative advocacy in the United States by lawyers working in the
nonprofit sector, has given way to a much more varied and contested set of understandings.
Liberal and conservative public interest law groups, pursuing opposing policy agendas, dispute
the legitimacy of each other’s claims to serve constituencies that are truly disadvantaged in the
political process.32 Friendly critics of purely procedural definitions of public interest law have
asked rhetorically whether lawyers who represent groups that are “underrepresented” because
their purposes are abhorrent—such as Nazis, pedophiles, terrorists, and serial killers—fall within
the definition of public interest law.33 Some lawyers for poor people eschew traditional forms of
advocacy in the name of community organizing,34 raising questions about whether such work
qualifies as “public interest law.”35 Private firms devote considerable time to pro bono and
impact work, and some private sector firms call themselves “private public interest law firms,”

30

See Joel F. Handler et al., The Public Interest Law Industry, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 19, at 42, 47–
49.
31
For a discussion of the role of pro bono in meeting the legal needs of the poor, see Scott L. Cummings, The
Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2004). See also Rebecca L. Sandefur, Lawyers’ Pro Bono Service and
American-Style Civil Legal Assistance, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 79 (2007). For further discussion on the causeoriented work of small “private public interest law firms,” see Cummings & Southworth, supra note 12.
32
See, e.g., Nancy Blodgett, The Ralph Naders of the Right, A.B.A. J., May 1984, at 71 (quoting Ralph Nader, who
said that conservative public interest law firms were “agents of corporations and not public interest law firms”); Paul
C. Gerber, The Pacific Legal Foundation: Its Goal Is Deregulation, CAL. LAW., Nov. 1981, at 26, 28 (quoting
Robert L. Gnaizda, a senior attorney of Public Advocates, Inc., who asserted that “The Pacific Legal Foundation is a
public interest law firm in the same way that catsup is a vegetable under Reagan’s new school lunch guidelines”);
Edwin Meese III, Foreword to BRINGING JUSTICE TO THE PEOPLE, at i, ii (Lee Edwards ed. 2004) (describing leaders
of liberal advocacy groups as “so-called public interest lawyers”).
33
ALAN K. CHEN & SCOTT L. CUMMINGS, PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 14
(2013).
34
See, e.g., William P. Quigley, Reflections of Community Organizers: Lawyering for Empowerment of Community
Organizations, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 455, 456 (1994).
35
See CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 33, at 29.
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but there are no settled criteria for distinguishing such firms from their commercial
counterparts.36 Plaintiffs’ lawyers sometimes pursue changes in the practices of corporations and
government actors,37 but the idea that they might be viewed as a species of public interest lawyer
meets resistance from those who insist that public interest lawyers’ motives must be altruistic.38
Thus, there is considerable disagreement today about what “public interest law” means, and to
what organizations and lawyers the term applies.39
Some scholars have struggled to specify the boundaries of public interest law in order to
describe its features and characteristics, defend its premises, and evaluate its efficacy as a
mechanism for remedying social, political, and economic disadvantage. Laura Beth Nielsen and
Catherine Albiston, for example, have defined public interest law groups as “organizations in the
36

See Cummings & Southworth, supra note 12, at 184 (“Distinguishing private public interest firms from their
commercial counterparts is . . . challenging . . . .”); see also BERNARD KOTEEN OFFICE OF PUB. INTEREST ADVISING
AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, PRIVATE PUBLIC INTEREST AND PLAINTIFF’S FIRM GUIDE 3 (2010) (“There is no official
test for what makes a firm a private public interest law firm. It is a somewhat elastic term, used to describe private,
for-profit firms that dedicate at least a significant portion of their caseload to matters that have some broad social,
political, or economic impact.”); cf. Heineman, supra note 18, at 185 n.10 (defining a private firm as a public
interest law firm “when it spends more than 25[%] of its time on public interest practice”).
37
See Howard M. Erichson, Doing Good, Doing Well, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2087, 2090–91 (2004) (arguing that mass
torts “combine the disparate worlds of personal injury litigation and public interest law practice” and that tort
lawyers tend to be motivated partly by “social change objectives”); see also Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory
Compliance: The Pursuit of Symmetry in Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147, 2164 (2000) (noting that plaintiffs’
lawyers and public interest lawyers are “close allies”); cf. Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic
Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 79–82
(2003) (noting that a plaintiffs’ lawyer motivated solely by financial gain might nevertheless further the public
interest by deterring corporate illegality).
38
See, e.g., David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CALIF.
L. REV. 209, 210 n.1 (2003) (“[A] public-interest lawyer is a lawyer for whom making money is not the primary
purpose for taking the case . . . .”); Andrew Jay McClurg, Fight Club: Doctors vs. Lawyers—A Peace Plan
Grounded in Self-Interest, 88 TEMPLE L. REV. 309, 350 (2011) (“Plaintiffs’ personal injury lawyers are not public
interest lawyers. The most successful ones are among the wealthiest professionals in America.”).
39
See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND
CAUSE LAWYERING 5 (2004) (“[T]o talk about public interest lawyering is to take on irresolvable disputes about
what is, or is not, in the public interest.”); see also Susan D. Carle, Re-Valuing Lawyering for Middle-Income
Clients, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 719, 729–30 (2001) (“Today, people use the term ‘public interest’ law as a gloss for a
wide range of sometimes contradictory lawyering categories.”); Scott L. Cummings, The Pursuit of Legal Rights—
and Beyond, 59 UCLA L. REV. 506, 517 (2012) (“[F]orty years after the invention of public interest law, we no
longer have a working definition of what exactly it is.”); Rhode, supra note 11, at 2029 (“[There are no] rigorous,
widely accepted criteria for determining what constitutes a ‘public interest’ legal organization . . . .”).
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voluntary sector that employ at least one lawyer at least part time, and whose activities (1) seek
to produce significant benefits for those who are external to the organization’s participants, and
(2) involve at least one adjudicatory strategy.”40 Others have adopted a broader conception that
does not require that organizations engage in litigation provided they invoke law in some larger
sense. In her research on prominent public interest legal organizations’ priorities, strategies, and
funding, Deborah Rhode has defined the category “to include nonprofit tax-exempt groups that
attempt[] to use law to achieve social objectives.”41 Scott Cummings has proposed applying the
term only to “legal activities that advance the interests and causes of constituencies that are
disadvantaged in the private market or the political process relative to more powerful social
actors.”42 Under this definition, he suggests, public interest law ordinarily involves using “legal
means to challenge corporate or governmental policies and practices.”43
While the forgoing scholarship attempts to define public interest law in order to examine
and evaluate the organizations, lawyers, and practices associated with it, my current research
asks a different set of empirical questions. It makes the definitional battle itself the central focus
of inquiry.
This Article presents preliminary data about two arenas in which actors construct the
meaning of public interest law: in organizations’ use of the label to describe themselves in U.S.
Supreme Court litigation, and in two major newspapers’ use of the phrase. It focuses on the
extent to which the claims that conservative and libertarian groups have made in their briefs
match the media’s portrayal of those groups.

40

Nielsen & Albiston, supra note 11, at 1601.
Rhode, supra note 11, at 2029.
42
Cummings, supra note 39, at 523.
43
Id. at 524.
41
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For purposes of this preliminary analysis, I group together organizations that pursue a
broad range of policy agendas associated with the American political right. I do not attempt to
assess whether the policy positions that these organizations take are really “conservative” in
intellectual or philosophical terms. Nor do I mean to suggest that all of these groups are similar;
they are not. Their policy agendas appeal to different strands of the American political right,
including social conservatives, libertarians, and business interests, and some of these causes are
in significant tension—sometimes outright conflict—with one another.44 But all of the
organizations grouped together as “conservative/libertarian” share a feature that is relevant to the
question of how the political valence of public interest law has changed since the 1970s: all of
them pursue policy agendas associated with the coalition that has consistently coalesced behind
the Republican Party during the past several decades.
Organizations that file U.S. Supreme Court briefs often introduce themselves to the Court
with short descriptions of their form and purposes. As authors of, or signatories to, these briefs,
organizations have substantial control over the self-descriptions contained in the briefs. To
qualify for 501(c)(3) tax exempt charitable status, legal advocacy organizations must be
organized and operated exclusively for exempt purposes.45 Organizations that claim 501(c)(3)
charitable status must ensure that their self-descriptions in briefs (and other publications) are
consistent with their claims that they operate for exempt charitable purposes. But they can easily
do so without invoking the phrase “public interest law.” Nonprofit organizations that choose to
describe themselves as “public interest law” organizations are laying claim to a term—a frame—

44

See SOUTHWORTH, supra note 7, at 4–5, 175–81.
I.R.C. § 510(c)(3) (2006). Exempt charitable purposes include “[r]elief of the poor, the distressed, or the
underprivileged; advancement of religion; advancement of education or science; lessening the burdens of
government; lessening neighborhood tensions; eliminating prejudice and discrimination; defending human and civil
rights secured by law; and combating community deterioration and juvenile delinquency.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)1 (2012).
45
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that is linked with the legal profession’s long-standing aspiration to promote access to justice and
give voice to “have-nots.”
The media are another site on which various social groups, institutions, and ideologies
“struggle over the definition and construction of social reality.”46 Unlike briefs, in which
organizations generally can present themselves as public interest law groups without any
significant external influence, media accounts of the organizations’ work are mediated by
journalists and editors, who essentially serve as “brokers” in this process.47 Although journalists
are consumers of frames provided by their sources, they are not passive recipients. Journalists’
working norms and practices influence the process. Stories based on information supplied in
press releases, briefs, and official proceedings may tend to favor interpretations offered by the
organizations themselves, while stories based on interviews initiated by the reporter, or based on
the reporter’s independent research and analysis, may tend to favor competing interpretations.48
The balance norm in journalism pushes toward including both “conservative” and “liberal”
interpretations. Reporters’ presentations may also be affected by their perceptions of readers’
expectations.
III. THE RESEARCH AND PRELIMINARY DATA
A. U.S. Supreme Court Briefs
I searched two online databases, LexisNexis and Gale’s The Making of Modern Law:
U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs, for all U.S. Supreme Court filings from 1960 through
2011 in which the phrase “public interest law” or “public interest legal” (public interest
law/legal) appeared. Although a broader search for all “public interest” organizations might
46

Fiss & Hirsch, supra note 13, at 34 (quoting 5 MASS COMMUNICATION REVIEW YEARBOOK (Michael Gurevitch &
Mark R. Levy eds., 1985)).
47
Id. at 33; see also Gamson & Modigliani, supra note 16, at 3 (noting that media both reflect public discourse and
contribute to its creation).
48
Gamson & Modigliani, supra note 16, at 8.
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have turned up some law groups, it also would have included organizations run by scientists,
theologians, professors, economists, and doctors. Sorting through those to find the law-related
groups would have been a massive undertaking.
From 1973, when the first such brief was filed, through 2011, over 1,400 such documents
were filed on behalf of almost 300 organizations. In 1,281 of those filings, the phrase “public
interest law” or “public interest legal” appeared in an organization’s name or self-description.
The vast majority of those—1,217 (95%)—were amicus briefs, in which a statement of the
amicus curiae’s identity is required by Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, but
they also included twenty-three party briefs, twenty-four petitions for certiorari, and other
miscellaneous filings.
The organizations characterized as public interest law groups include many wellestablished groups associated with left-of-center political agendas, such as the ACLU, Alliance
for Justice, Asian Pacific Legal Center, California Rural Legal Assistance, Center for
Constitutional Rights, Center for Law and Social Policy, Center for Law and the Public Interest,
Children’s Defense Fund, Disability Rights Advocates, Environmental Defense Fund, Equal
Rights Advocates, Lambda Legal Defense, Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law,
Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), LDF, NOW Legal Defense
and Education Fund (now Legal Momentum), National Center for Youth Law, National
Women’s Law Center, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Public Advocates, Public
Citizen Litigation Group, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund (now EarthJustice), Western Center
on Law and Poverty, and Youth Law Center. They also included a large variety of well-known
conservative and libertarian organizations, such as the Pacific Legal Foundation, National
Chamber Litigation Center, Southeastern Legal Foundation, Washington Legal Foundation,

13

Institute for Justice, Landmark Legal Foundation, Mountain States Legal Foundation, Center for
Individual Rights, American Center for Law and Justice, Liberty Counsel, and Alliance Defense
Fund.
To assess (in very crude terms) the overall political composition of organizations filing
these briefs and trends in their participation in Supreme Court litigation, I assigned all of the
organizations to one of two broad categories: (1) conservative and libertarian; or (2) “other.” I
based the conservative and libertarian designations on my prior research for a book about
lawyers of the political right49 and on my review of the organizations’ mission statements. I
recognize that the assignment of organizations to the conservative and libertarian category
involves an interpretive judgment about the groups’ purposes. Therefore, I have listed all fortyseven organizations in that category in the Appendix, so that readers may independently evaluate
the designations.
Conservative and libertarian groups are well represented among the organizations that
have most often claimed the “public interest law” or “public interest legal” labels in U.S.
Supreme Court briefs. Table 1 lists the organizations that have described themselves as public
interest law groups in five or more Supreme Court briefs since 1970. Conservative and
libertarian groups appear in bold typeface.
TABLE 1: ORGANIZATIONS MOST FREQUENTLY DESCRIBED AS
“PUBLIC INTEREST LAW/LEGAL” IN SUPREME COURT BRIEFS, 1970–2011
Organization
Washington Legal Foundation
Mountain States Legal Foundation
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice (now Public Justice)
Institute for Justice
Pacific Legal Foundation
49

See SOUTHWORTH, supra note 7.
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First
# of
Brief
Briefs
1981
308
1978
72
1988
69
1991
58
1974
56

Equal Rights Advocates
Legal Foundation of America
National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal
Center
New England Legal Foundation
American Center for Law and Justice
Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia
Women's Law Project
California Women's Law Center
Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence
Legal Aid Society–Employment Law Center
Center for Individual Rights
Northwest Women's Law Center
Alliance Defense Fund
Center for Public Interest Law
Defenders of Property Rights
Juvenile Law Center
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
Landmark Legal Foundation
Southeastern Legal Foundation
Thomas More Law Center
Atlantic Legal Foundation
National Center for Lesbian Rights
Youth Law Center
Asian Pacific American Legal Center
Connecticut Women's Education and Legal Fund
Lambda Legal
Asian Law Caucus
Center for Law in the Public Interest
Gulf & Great Plains Legal Foundation (now Landmark Legal
Foundation)
NAACP Legal Defense Fund
National Health Law Program
National Legal Foundation
Public Advocates, Inc.
Oregonians in Action Legal Center
Alliance for Justice
Asian Law Alliance
Center for Law and Social Policy
Center for Public Representation
Council for Public Interest Law
Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders
Global Rights
Public Counsel
Americans United for Life
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1977
1981
2004

45
40
37

1982
1992
1975
1977
1993
1999
1987
1990
1982
2003
1984
1991
1987
1997
1987
1977
2000
1989
1989
1977
2005
1980
1990
1991
1975
1982

35
31
31
29
21
21
20
18
18
17
15
15
15
14
14
14
14
13
12
12
11
11
11
10
9
9

1975
1988
1999
1975
1996
1983
2001
1986
1987
1977
1995
1982
1999
1989

9
8
8
8
7
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
5

Center on National Labor Policy
National Gay Rights Advocates
New York Lawyers for the Public Interest
Northwest Legal Foundation

1978
1986
1987
1994

5
5
5
5

Below, Figure 1 shows the number of U.S. Supreme Court briefs on behalf of all
organizations that described themselves as “public interest law” or “public interest legal” groups
since 1970. The portion of the bar in black corresponds with briefs filed by the conservative and
libertarian groups listed in the Appendix, while the grey portion reflects filings by all other
groups. Overall, the figure shows a dramatic increase in the number of briefs filed by
organizations that characterize themselves as public interest groups. It also demonstrates a
significant rise in such filings by conservative and libertarian organizations and a striking
increase in their share of the total number of briefs filed by self-described “public interest
law/legal” groups during that period.
Collectively, the forty-seven conservative and libertarian organizations listed in the
Appendix filed 812 of the 1,281 briefs filed by “public interest law/legal” organizations from
1970 to 2011—almost two-thirds of all Supreme Court briefs filed by groups describing
themselves as “public interest law/legal” organizations during that period.
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FIGURE 1: U.S. SUPREME COURT BRIEFS FILED BY “PUBLIC INTEREST LAW/LEGAL” GROUPS,
1970–2011

These data do not necessarily mean that conservative and libertarian groups file more
Supreme Court briefs than liberal organizations. Rather, it shows a disparity in the number of
briefs by groups self-identifying as public interest law organizations in those briefs. Some of the
most well-established legal advocacy groups typically do not use the phrase “public interest law”
or “public interest legal” to describe themselves; rather, they adopt different frames—for
example, civil rights, social justice, or civil liberties—to characterize their missions. The most
obvious examples are the ACLU and LDF, which served as primary models for the first wave of
17

public interest law organizations in the late 1960s. These organizations occasionally appear as
“public interest law” groups in U.S. Supreme Court briefs and are, therefore, among the “other”
organizations that appear in the data. However, these “other” organizations have long described
their missions in terms of particular substantive agendas rather than the procedural justice
rationale of public interest law.50 The ACLU, for example, typically characterizes itself as “a
nationwide, nonprofit, nonpartisan organization . . . dedicated to the principles of liberty and
equality embodied in the Constitution.””51 Similarly, LDF ordinarily describes itself as “a nonprofit legal organization established to assist African Americans and other people of color in
securing their civil and constitutional rights.”52 The NRDC, another organization associated with
the liberal vanguard of public interest law,53 calls itself “a non-profit conservation
organization.”54 All three groups are highly active in U.S. Supreme Court litigation. Indeed, it is
likely that each of them has filed more briefs than any of the organizations in Table 1, with the
possible exception of the Washington Legal Foundation.55 Thus, while conservative and
libertarian groups have aggressively courted the “public interest law” label in Supreme Court
briefs, progressives, including some of the most iconic liberal legal advocacy organizations,
often have relied on other language to describe their form and purposes.

50

See David R. Esquivel, Note, The Identity Crisis in Public Interest Law, 46 DUKE L.J. 327, 342–43 (1996).
See, e.g., Brief for the ACLU as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin,
132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (No. 11-345), 2012 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3361.
52
See, e.g., Brief for the ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1a, Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr.
of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2011) (Nos. 09-958, 09-1158, 10-283), 2011 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 947.
53
See David M. Trubek, Environmental Defense, I: Introduction to Interest Group Advocacy in Complex Disputes,
in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 19, at 151 (calling the NRDC one of the “largest foundation and membershipsupported [public interest law] firms”).
54
See, e.g., Brief for the American Bird Conservancy et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2, Nat’l
Ass’n of Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007) (Nos. 06-340, 06-549), 2007 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 306.
55
I have not yet calculated exact counts of filings by these groups from 1960 through 2011. Since 1980, however,
LDF has filed 211 briefs, the NRDC has filed 90, and the ACLU and its affiliates have filed over 1,000.
51
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Nor do these data show that the conservative and libertarian “public interest law/legal”
organizations that most frequently participate in Supreme Court litigation are especially
influential. As noted above, all but sixty-four of the 1,281 briefs included in Figure 1 are amicus
briefs. The rise of amicus participation by “public interest law/legal” groups correlates with a
larger trend of dramatically increased amicus participation in Supreme Court litigation since the
1960s,56 though evidence regarding the influence of amicus briefs on judicial outcomes is
inconclusive.57 In theory at least, amicus briefs might shape the Court’s decisions by supplying
useful information relevant to the merits of the decision, or by signaling the preferences of
various affected interest groups.58 The frequency of references to amici and quotations from
amicus briefs in the Supreme Court decisions has increased over time, which suggests some
impact on the Court’s decisions.59 The stunning number of briefs submitted by conservative and
libertarian public interest law groups may indicate an expectation by such groups that their
efforts will contribute to litigation success. That expectation may, in turn, reflect the

56

See ANDREW JAY KOSHNER, SOLVING THE PUZZLE OF INTEREST GROUP LITIGATION 7–11 (1998) (documenting a
steady increase in the percentage of cases with at least one amicus brief from 1950 to 1994); see also Joseph D.
Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
743, 751–52 (2000) (finding that the incidence of amicus curiae participation in the Supreme Court has increased
dramatically since 1960).
57
See Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S.
Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 807 (2004) (finding that amicus participation increases litigation
success); see also Gregg Ivers & Karen O’Connor, Friends as Foes: The Amicus Curiae Participation and
Effectiveness of the American Civil Liberties Union and Americans for Effective Law Enforcement in Criminal
Cases, 1969–1982, 9 LAW & POL’Y 161, 172 (1987) (finding that amicus participation by two advocacy groups, the
ACLU and Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, influenced litigation outcomes, but only when the Court was
ideologically predisposed to rule in favor of the outcomes they supported); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 56, at
797–98 (finding that in cases in which the Solicitor General did not participate as amicus or party, disparities of
amicus support were associated with greater success); Kevin T. McGuire, Obscenity, Libertarian Values, and
Decision Making in the Supreme Court, 18 AM. POL. Q. 47, 48 (1990) (finding a significant relationship between the
level of amicus participation and litigation success); Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Interest Group
Success in the Courts: Amicus Participation in the Supreme Court, 46 POL. RES. Q. 339 (1993) (finding no evidence
of amicus participants’ influence).
58
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 56, at 774–87; see also Collins, Jr., supra note 57, at 811–16.
59
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 56, at 756–58.
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increasingly conservative composition of the Court. But amicus activity may relate just as much
to organizations’ expectations regarding potential internal benefits—such as attracting members
and patrons and generating publicity—as to any realistic prospect of influencing the Court’s
decisions.60 The large number of briefs filed by conservative and libertarian groups may say
more about their “organizational maintenance” objectives—their interest in taking positions that
will promote their survival as organizations—than it does about their actual influence on the
Supreme Court.61
Although these data do not demonstrate that conservative and libertarian public interest
law groups are especially active and influential in Supreme Court litigation, they strongly
indicate that these organizations attach importance to the “public interest” designation and
actively seek to be regarded as public interest law groups by the Court and other potential
“audiences” for their briefs. They also suggest that, in this arena of activity, conservative and
libertarian groups have courted the “public interest law” label more aggressively than their
liberal counterparts over the past several decades. My future research will examine the various
other ways that nonprofit advocacy groups characterize their structures and missions in Supreme
Court briefs, and systematically compare the litigation activity of organizations that use those
other frames with those that call themselves public interest law groups.

60

See Lee Epstein, Interest Group Litigation During the Rehnquist Court Era, 9 J.L. & POL. 639, 675–76 (1993)
(citing evidence that interest groups litigate for “organizational maintenance” reasons). The preliminary data
presented here do not capture some of the factors that may differentiate effective briefs from inconsequential ones,
especially their quality, the extent to which they present arguments and information not included in other briefs, and
whether they support respondents or petitioners. Cf. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 56, at 749; Kevin T. McGuire,
Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: The Role of Experienced Lawyers in Litigation Success, 57 J. POL. 187, 194
(1995).
61
See EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 675–76.
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B. Major Newspapers: The New York Times and Wall Street Journal
To begin to understand how newspapers picked up the language of public interest law,
and how and when they have used it to identify organizations claiming to represent various
underrepresented constituencies, I compiled all mentions of “public interest law” or “public
interest legal” from 1960 to 2011 in articles, editorials, and op-ed pieces in two major national
newspapers: the New York Times and Wall Street Journal. There were 1,135 such articles,
editorials, and op-eds applying the term to a total of 214 identifiable organizations.62 The first of
those articles appeared in 1970.
Only twenty-four of the 214 identifiable organizations were conservative or libertarian
groups.63 But, among the organizations most frequently described as “public interest law/legal”
in these newspapers from 1970 to 2011, conservative and libertarian groups are well represented;
nine of the thirty-six organizations with eight or more mentions are conservative or libertarian.
Those organizations are listed in Table 2 in order of the frequency of their designation, with
conservative and libertarian groups highlighted in bold typeface. All but four of the

62

In another 177 instances, the terms “public interest law” or “public interest legal” appeared in advertisements or
letters to the editor.
63
These groups are the American Center for Law and Justice, American Legal Foundation, Americans United for
Life, Atlantic Legal Foundation, Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Capital Legal Foundation, Center for Individual
Rights, Federalist Society, Individual Rights Foundation, Institute for Justice, Judicial Watch, Landmark Legal
Foundation, Liberty Counsel, Mid-America Legal Foundation, Mid-Atlantic Legal Foundation, Mountain States
Legal Foundation, National Chamber Litigation Center, National Legal Foundation, New England Legal
Foundation, Pacific Legal Foundation, Rutherford Institute, Southeastern Legal Foundation, Thomas More Law
Center, and Washington Legal Foundation. All but four of these organizations—Capital Legal Foundation,
Federalist Society, Individual Rights Foundation, and Rutherford Institute—were among the organizations that
described themselves as “public interest law/legal” organizations in Supreme Court briefs in the same period. The
Federalist Society does not litigate and, in fact, does not take formal positions on public policy matters. The Capital
Legal Foundation no longer exists.
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organizations in this list are among those that described themselves as “public interest law/legal”
organizations in Supreme Court briefs.64
TABLE 2: ORGANIZATIONS LABELED AS “PUBLIC INTEREST LAW/ LEGAL” IN THE NEW YORK TIMES
AND THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, 1970–2011
Organization
Media Access Project
Institute for Justice
Natural Resources Defense Council
Washington Legal Foundation
Public Advocates
Mountain States Legal Foundation
Pacific Legal Foundation
Center for Law and Social Policy
Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia
Capital Legal Foundation
Council for Public Interest Law
Center for Individual Rights
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice
Public Citizen
Center for Law in the Public Interest
Center for Constitutional Rights
Tax Analysts and Advocates
National Gay Rights Advocates
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
American Center for Law and Justice
Citizens Communications Center
Food Research and Action Center
Public Interest Law Center
Brennan Center for Justice
Center for Public Interest Law

Number of Mentions
85
76
43
39
38
33
33
28
28
24
24
23
23
22
21
18
18
16
15
13
13
12
12
11
11

64

The only exceptions are the Brennan Center for Justice, Capital Legal Foundation, the Legal Resources Centre,
and the National Association for Public Interest Law (now Equal Justice Works). The Brennan Center typically
does not use public interest law” or “public interest legal” in its self-descriptions in briefs, instead calling itself “a
nonpartisan public policy and law institute focused on the fundamental issues of democracy and justice.” See, e.g.,
Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1–2, Turner v.
Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10-10), 2011 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 33. The Capital Legal Foundation was
a regional conservative legal organization established under the umbrella of the National Legal Center for the Public
Interest in the 1970s, but it is now defunct. The Legal Resources Centre is a South African human rights
organization. Equal Justice Works does not litigate; it seeks to promote “opportunities for law students and lawyers
that provide the training and skills that enable them to provide effective representation to underserved communities
and causes.” About the Organization, EQUAL JUSTICE WORKS, http://www.equaljusticeworks.org/about/history (last
visited Feb. 24, 2013).
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Legal Action Center
Legal Resources Center
Equal Justice Works
Government Accountability Project
Alliance for Justice
Business and Professional People for the Public Interest
Christic Institute
Community Rights Counsel
Equal Rights Advocates
NAACP Legal Defense Fund
Southeastern Legal Foundation
Americans United for Life
Environmental Defense Fund
Institute for Public Representation
Judicial Watch
Liberty Counsel
Landmark Legal Foundation
Public Interest Law Center of New Jersey
Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund
California Rural Legal Assistance
Thomas More Law Center
Youth Law Center

11
11
9
9
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
7
7
7
7
7
6
6
6
5
5
5

Several of the conservative and libertarian groups that have most actively promoted their
own characterization as public interest law groups in Supreme Court filings—those that filed five
or more such briefs—have not drawn that label from either the New York Times or the Wall
Street Journal.65 Future research will examine the alternative descriptions that journalists and
editors have applied to these organizations.
To begin to assess overall trends during this period and potential differences in these
newspapers’ coverage, I logged the number of mentions by year. Figures 2 and 3 show the
numbers of times “public interest law” or “public interest legal” applied to particular
organizations in the New York Times and Wall Street Journal respectively for each year from

65

Those organizations are the Legal Foundation of America, Alliance Defense Fund, New England Legal
Foundation, Claremont Institute’s Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, National Federation of Independent
Business Small Business Legal Center, Defenders of Property Rights, Oregonians in Action Legal Center, and
Northwest Legal Foundation.
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1970 to 2011. The black portions of the bars represent the total number of mentions attributable
to conservative and libertarian organizations, while the grey portions represent mentions of all
other organizations.
FIGURE 2: MENTIONS OF “PUBLIC INTEREST LAW/LEGAL”
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE NEW YORK TIMES, 1970–2011
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FIGURE 3: MENTIONS OF “PUBLIC INTEREST LAW/LEGAL”
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, 1970–2011

These data show that both newspapers began to apply the terms “public interest law” or
“public interest legal” to conservative and libertarian groups soon after the organizations started
to claim the term for themselves in the mid-1970s. Thereafter, both newspapers frequently
applied the label to conservative and libertarian groups, but those organizations did not constitute
nearly as large a proportion of groups characterized as such in the newspapers as they did in
Supreme Court briefs. Overall, conservative and libertarian groups comprised a somewhat
higher proportion of “public interest law/legal” groups in the Wall Street Journal than in the New
York Times; from 1970 to 2011, they accounted for 115 of 331 (35%) of such mentions in the
Wall Street Journal and 197 of 762 (26%) of such mentions in the New York Times. In both
newspapers, use of the phrase to describe identifiable groups has gradually declined since 2004,
even though the filing of Supreme Court briefs by such groups has continued unabated.
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Although the frequency of newspapers’ use of “public interest law/legal” to describe
organizations may indicate something about how the meaning of the phrase has changed and
how it has stretched to encompass advocates for new constituencies, the counts themselves can
be misleading because the context of the media’s use of the phrase is often essential for
understanding the meaning conveyed by this description. Reporters and editors sometimes
reveal a great deal in their choice of punctuation—for example, whether the phrase “public
interest law” appears in quotation marks or not.66 They sometimes attach modifiers to the phrase
as applied to particular organizations—for example, “liberal,”67 “conservative,”68 “libertarian,”69
“business-oriented,”70 “industry-funded,”71 “Christian,”72 “pro-life,”73 “bipartisan [and]
ecumenical,”74 “self-described,”75 and “so-called.”76 They elaborate with short descriptions of
66

See, e.g., William M. Bulkeley & Diane Tracy, Lead-Paint Case May Stir Round of Product Suits, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 18, 1987, at 35 (referring to Trial Lawyers for Public Justice); Thomas E. Ricks, Big TV Retailer Helps
Suppliers, Cable Firms, Damages Direct Sellers, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1987, at 1 (referring to Media Access
Project).
67
See, e.g., Clifford D. May, Robert Wallach: An Eccentric with Friends in High Places, N.Y. TIMES, June 22,
1987, at B6 (referring to Public Advocates).
68
See, e.g., Stuart Taylor, Jr., Senate Backs “Veto” of Watt’s Move, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1981, at 10 (referring to
Mountain States Legal Foundation); Float Like a Butterfly, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 1978, at 6 (referring to the Pacific
Legal Foundation).
69
See, e.g., Steven A. Holmes, Political Right’s Point Man on Race, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1997, at 24 (referring to
the Institute for Justice); John Simons, Hogs on a Web? CFTC Defends Internet Rules, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1999, at
C1 (referring to the Institute for Justice).
70
See, e.g., Warren Weaver, Jr., The Chamber’s Public Interest Law Firm, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1977, at D1
(referring to the National Chamber Litigation Center); Stephen Wermiel, High Court Faces Big Nuclear-Power
Cases, Including Ruling on California Restrictions, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 1982, at 15 (referring to Pacific Legal
Foundation).
71
John Simons, New Internet Privacy Laws Appear Less Likely with Release of New Survey, WALL ST. J., May 13,
1999, at B9 (referring to the Center for Democracy and Technology).
72
James Dao, Sleepy Election Is Jolted by Evolution, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2005, at A12 (referring to the Thomas
More Law Center).
73
See, e.g., Marcia Chambers, Initiator of ‘Baby Doe’ Case Unshaken, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1983, at 45 (referring
to Americans United for Life Legal Defense Fund).
74
See, e.g., George Judson, A Snowman and Santa Make Jersey City’s Holiday Scene Legal, a Judge Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 1995, at B4.
75
See, e.g., Bret Stephens, Mind the GAP, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2007, at A16.
76
John B. Oakes, Editorial, Watt’s Very Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1980, at A15 (referring to the Mountain States
Legal Foundation).
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the organizations’ missions, such as, “a public interest law firm that defends traditional
marriage” (describing the Liberty Counsel);77 “a public interest law firm that litigates against
abortion” (describing the Americans United for Life);78 “a public interest law firm that argues for
wider expression of religious, and generally Christian traditions” (describing the Becket Fund for
Religious Liberty);79 and “a public interest law and policy center that supports the death penalty”
(describing the Washington Legal Foundation).80 Some of the descriptions convey thinly veiled
criticism. A New York Times story on the Mountain States Legal Foundation, for example,
called it “a public interest law group supported by Western mining, timber and industrial
companies.”81
IV. CONCLUSION
The phrase “public interest law” may once have been understood to apply to a relatively
small number of organizations and lawyers serving a limited set of constituencies, but the
sources reviewed in this Article demonstrate that the term is now used to describe a much larger
set of groups, advocates, and policy agendas. These “public interest law/legal” organizations
take opposing sides of nearly every divisive social and economic issue of our time; they advocate
for gun control as well as gun rights, for environmental protection and property rights, for
stronger protections for organized labor and for the “right to work,” for pro-choice and pro-life
positions, and for diversity initiatives and the end of affirmative action. All of these groups
claim the special professional legitimacy that the “public interest law” label confers.
Conservative and libertarian organizations have aggressively asserted their public interest law
status in Supreme Court briefs, and collectively they account for roughly two-thirds of all briefs
77

Adam Liptak, Parental Rights Upheld for Lesbian Ex-Partner, Aug. 5, 2006, N.Y. TIMES, at A11.
Linda Greenhouse, Justices Reaffirm Abortion Access for Emergencies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2006, at A1.
79
Ronald Smothers, Police Officers’ Beards Set off Constitutional Debate, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1998, at B5.
80
Gustav Niebuhr, Governor Grants Pope’s Plea for Life of a Missouri Inmate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1999, at A1.
81
Seth S. King, Watt Vows to Shun Conflicts Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1981, at A14.
78
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filed by groups that have described themselves as “public interest law” or “public interest legal”
organizations in Supreme Court briefs since 1970. They have been somewhat less successful,
however, in securing that tag from the two major newspapers considered here, which may
suggest that they may not yet enjoy the legitimacy they seek.
Future research will examine the resources that public interest law organizations
command, the alternative frames that legal advocacy groups sometimes employ, and how
journalists and editors mediate the use of these characterizations of organizations’ purposes and
form. A content analysis of the briefs and news stories should reveal critical contextual elements
not considered in this preliminary examination of the data. The research will consider possible
differences in the use of the phrase “public interest law” in two national newspapers with
different political orientations, at least on their editorial pages. It will examine how the trends
described in this Article might relate to other variables, such as election cycles, differences
between merits briefs and amicus briefs, the composition of the Supreme Court, and newspapers’
editorial leadership. It will explore various themes associated with the phrase “public interest
law” in news accounts and how the term is defined in other sources not discussed in this Article,
such as legislative testimony, organizations’ websites, and materials generated by law school
placement offices and career services directories. A preliminary look at the latter sources
suggest that they are a particularly rich source of evidence of disagreement about the boundaries
of public interest law, perhaps because this is an arena in which the tangible consequences of
competing definitions are particularly consequential for access to scholarships, summer stipends,
loan forgiveness, and pro bono credit.
All in all, systematic examination of the discourse of public interest law should help put a
finer point on exactly what we mean when we exhort lawyers to engage in this type of practice.
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It might also contribute toward understanding whether the term obscures more than it reveals
about the relative disadvantage of the clients represented and how policies pursued under its
banner relate to the public good.
APPENDIX: CONSERVATIVE AND LIBERTARIAN ORGANIZATIONS THAT SELF-IDENTIFY AS
“PUBLIC INTEREST LAW/LEGAL” GROUPS IN U.S. SUPREME COURT BRIEFS
Conservative Organization
Pacific Legal Foundation
National Chamber Litigation Center
Southeastern Legal Foundation
Mountain States Legal Foundation
American Legal Foundation
Legal Foundation of America
Washington Legal Foundation
Citizens Legal Defense Alliance Inc.
Crime Victim's Legal Advocacy Institute
Gulf & Great Plains Legal Foundation82
New England Legal Foundation
Americans for Effective Law Enforcement Inc.
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation Inc.
Free Congress Research and Education Foundation Inc.
Victims' Assistance Legal Organization Inc.
Mid-Atlantic Legal Foundation
Landmark Legal Foundation
Mid-America Legal Foundation83
Americans United for Life
Atlantic Legal Foundation
Lincoln Legal Foundation
Center for Individual Rights
Defenders of Property Rights
Institute for Justice
Patriot's Defense Foundation
American Center for Law and Justice
Northwest Legal Foundation
Law Enforcement Legal Defense Fund
Oregonians in Action Legal Center
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
Great Lakes Legal Foundation
Rocky Mountain Family Legal Foundation
82
83

Renamed Landmark Legal Foundation in the mid-1980s.
Organization no longer exists.
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First Brief
1974
1977
1977
1978
1980
1981
1981
1982
1982
1982
1982
1983
1983
1983
1983
1986
1987
1988
1989
1989
1989
1990
1991
1991
1991
1992
1994
1995
1996
1997
1997
1997

Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence
National Legal Foundation
Thomas More Law Center
Alliance Defense Fund
Judicial Watch Inc.
Liberty Institute
National Federation of Independent Business Small Business
Legal Center
Texas Justice Foundation
Advocates for Faith & Freedom
American Unity Legal Defense Fund
European Centre for Law and Justice
Life Legal Defense Foundation
Allied Educational Fund
U. S. Bill of Rights Foundation
Liberty Counsel
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1999
1999
2000
2003
2003
2004
2004
2004
2005
2006
2006
2006
2008
2008
2009
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